BRAZILIAN RELATIONS WITH PORTUGUESE AFRICA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ELUSIVE “LUSO-BRAZILIAN COMMUNITY”

The year of 1972 brought the marked aggravation of a series of political-economic conflicts in Brazil’s relations with developing countries outside the Western Hemisphere, calling into serious question the continued viability of its efforts of several years to maintain good relations with both Portugal and the nonaligned states (particularly those of Africa). Following successful tours of Latin American countries in 1971, Foreign Minister Mário Gibson Barboza termed 1972 the “Year of Africa” and visited Zaire and eight countries of West Africa to advance Brazil’s ambitions as a leader of the LDCs by offering technical assistance, development financing, and increased trade, cooperation in commodity agreements, and cultural exchange based on the African component of Brazilian culture. This tour was intended to promote the image of Brazil as a peacefully multiracial, rapidly developing tropical civilization eager to…

AUTHOR’S NOTE: The author wishes to express his appreciation to Elizabethtown College, which provided funds to support field research for this article, and to the numerous Brazilian, African, and American diplomats and scholars who commented upon the project and earlier drafts of this paper.

share with others the solutions to economic growth which it had found.

The same year, the sesquicentennial of national independence, was also proclaimed "The Year of the Luso-Brazilian Community" by Brasilia and Lisbon. Considerable publicity was used to throw into relief the creation of a loosely organized, culturally based, commonwealth-type association of the Portuguese-speaking territories of the world, formalizing what had long been called a "very special" historical relationship based upon allegedly unique racial and cultural qualities of Portuguese colonization of the tropics. Several previous treaties, much rhetoric, and the ideas of Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre on "Lusotropicalism" already existed as a foundation for this Community (Selcher, 1974: 143-188). The 1953 Treaty of Friendship and Consultation, pledging both parties to prior consultation on foreign policy matters of common interest, was the oldest relevant legal document. Agreements from 1965 and 1966 set up provisions for cooperation and exchange in a wide variety of cultural, economic, and technical areas. Others include action on social welfare, avoidance of double taxing of incomes, and tourism. Elaborate joint commemoration of the independence anniversary furnished the vehicle for ratification in April 1972 of the "Convention on Equality of Rights and Duties," which established a common citizenship for Portugal and Brazil, requiring subsequent implementing legislation in each country but extending as far as the right to vote and to hold public office.

By mutual agreement, Portugal's African colonies were included in the treaties, facilitating a Brazilian presence there in trade, investments, and raw-materials acquisition, with the establishment of free ports in Luanda and Lourenço Marques. Portuguese Africa interested Brazil because of cultural similarities, the potential exchange of manufactures for raw materials (including oil and uranium), and the rapidly growing Brazilian navy's hopes of using Angola and perhaps the Cape Verde Islands as support bases for future South Atlantic fleet maneuvers.

In early 1972 the national interests of Brazil in Africa appeared to the Médici government to be diverse enough and of a saliency which was low enough to evade an obvious choice between Black Africa and Lisbon, although some Africans and a few Brazilians described the situation in such polar terms. The international political incompatibility of courting both parties and the divided nature of the foreign policy public and decision makers on the degree to which the historically close ties with Portugal should be allowed to direct the emerging relationship with the African continent counseled prudence and a quiet low-profile approach. The result was an evolutionary economic relationship with both independent Black Africa and Portuguese Africa which awkwardly tried to create a middle course politically just as it was becoming less and less feasible to do so in terms of the international environment. The efficacy of this policy became uncertain during 1972 when both the Black Africans and the Portuguese redoubled pressure and influence on Brazil to side decisively one way or the other. The strongly anti-colonialist advances of the United Nations General Assembly during 1972 made the "Year of Africa" and the "Year of the Luso-Brazilian Community" a contradiction in terms.

The first time that political ambivalence and inconsistency in official African policy came to prominent public notice in the Médici years was during the "ministers' quarrel" which began in February 1972. Delfim Neto, with the advice of a foreign policy advisor, led the business-oriented Finance Ministry view that opportunities afforded in Portuguese Africa by the Luso-Brazilian Community constituted the most promising entry point for national interests in Africa. Publicly faced with this judgment from a prestigious, powerful government figure during preparations for Gibson's well-publicized African tour, the more politically-sensitive Foreign Ministry retorted that independent Black Africa was of greater importance and that the nation would be unwise to compromise itself with colonial problems. Considerable press coverage was given to the disagreement, which was allowed to continue for several months because the decentralized style of the Médici administration allowed the international branch of each major ministry to go its own way with minimal coordination. When the divergencies on Africa became too uncomfortable and personal, presidential consultation with both Delfim and Gibson produced a compromise, to pursue both
paths in a less ostentatious manner without public disagreement or bureaucratic infighting.

The straddling posture continued to characterize Brazilian policy on the Portuguese Africa question for almost a year, with the Finance Ministry and the Presidency slightly tilted toward further development of the Community concept and the Foreign Ministry somewhat toward independent Black Africa. Insufficient progress was made on either front to justify a clear official taking of sides, for both groups of partisans were staking their cases largely on wishful thinking about the probable future opportunities for Brazil in each region. Neither was the matter urgent enough to demand a clear solution beyond the principle that trade and investment relations do not imply political affinity or approval. Friendly gestures toward Portugal and Africa were made simultaneously, with the apparent attempt to remain as free as possible from Portuguese-African tensions.

The very success generally attributed to the Foreign Minister’s African tour of October 25–November 20, 1972 served to underscore the beginnings of the erosion of Brazil’s Community option. Because a principal purpose of the tour was to elicit African cooperation in international organizations and emphasize the “globalist” foreign policy which Brazil was developing as an aspiring world power, the neat separation of political and economic issues in Portuguese Africa became more difficult to maintain. In an extensive newspaper interview before leaving for Africa, Gibson reaffirmed a desire to continue special relations with Portugal, and cited African comprehension of the Luso-Brazilian relationship, as mentioned in the Manifesto of Lusaka, as a reason why the Portuguese ties need not impede improvement of relations with Africa or vice-versa (Jornal do Brasil, October 15, 1972: 9-10).

Throughout his trip the Foreign Minister was made aware of the strength of African feeling on the issue of independence for Portuguese Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique as African leaders either requested full support for the anti-colonial position or suggested that Brazil actively encourage Portugal to give up its colonies, perhaps lending good offices or drawing up an acceptable timetable for independence. Gibson skillfully avoided direct answers to the numerous questions on the subject at press conferences by refusing to comment on the internal affairs of another country, or by assuring the Africans that neither the state of Brazilian relations with Portugal (implicitly including voting support for Portugal’s colonial positions at the United Nations) nor its criticized sizeable trade with South Africa need affect in any way Brazil’s relations with independent Black Africa. In the nine joint communiqués issued, economic interests common to Africa and Brazil were played up and explicit condemnation of colonialism was omitted, a task made easier by the moderate political stance of most of the countries visited during the trip. The formulation used was worded in a way acceptable to traditional Brazilian views, as support for “self-determination of peoples,” “non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states,” “the peaceful settlement of disputes,” and repudiation of racial discrimination, except in the communiqué with Nigeria, from which any reference to self-determination is absent and with regard to which there was greatest media criticism of Brazil’s position.

While numerous official African visitors were received in Brazil before and after this first trip of a Brazilian foreign minister to Africa, groups supporting the Portuguese connection were steadily advancing their cause, most notably with the August 1972 visit of Portuguese counter-insurgency expert Colonel Hermes de Araújo Oliveira and with the arrival immediately after Gibson’s return of 300 businessmen from Portugal and its colonies. Well-timed initiatives indicated that Portugal was weighing the value of further concessions to provide an alternative to Black Africa and stall the Foreign Ministry’s pro-Africa plans. The height of their efforts occurred around the May 1973 visit of President Médici and Gibson to Portugal, as a return gesture to the earlier visits of President Thomás and Prime Minister Caetano. Chief among the items discussed was the activation of the Community intentions and pledges, which had not advanced in the previous eight months. The Brazilian government attributed stagnation in the economic plane to multilateral commitments already assumed by the two parties under EFTA and LAFTA, alleging that a free-trade zone with
Portugal and its colonies was thereby impeded. Lisbon denied that there were intractable economic problems in the way of closer association, while the impression grew there that political rather than economic motives caused Brazil's new reticence.

A climate of mutual suspicion was beginning to build, revolving around the question of Portuguese Africa. The Brazilians were wary of what could have been Portuguese plans to ensnare them into bolstering fading Lusitanian control in the territories (perhaps militarily), while Portuguese officials privately feared that Brazilian designs were to replace Portugal economically in an independent Portuguese-speaking Africa. Portugal felt its African hold to be quite firm at this time and saw the Brazilian predictions of eventual independence as alarmist. After centuries of trying to restrict Brazil's relations with Angola and Mozambique, the Portuguese were now ready to reverse position enough to use the Community to counter increasing international isolation, but they were not eager to find themselves overwhelmed or displaced by a more powerful Brazil, which was developing economically at a rapid pace and for the first time in a decade showed a capacity and a desire to formulate a policy toward Portuguese Africa which was at variance with that of Portugal. At the same time, the Médici government was beginning to pressure Portugal diplomatically and firmly to change its African policy and was becoming irritated at Portugal's resistance, partly because of Portuguese refusal to adapt to new international circumstances and partly because the embarrassing moments Brazil had suffered in international organizations through support for Portugal had profited it little.2

The Luso-Brazilian Community which the Portuguese offered to President Médici in Lisbon was one of unequals, without independence for the colonies and with Lisbon imposing conditions upon Brazilian activity there. Lisbon's interpretation of the Community was predicated on the definition of the "colonies" as "overseas provinces," making the matter of independence irrelevant. Brazil insisted that a Luso-Brazilian Community could be formed only if all territories involved were independent and willing. The Foreign Ministry view prevailed as Brazil made clear its disinclination to become involved in a repressive movement across the South Atlantic or to associate more closely with Portugal while such a relationship had as sine qua non the acceptance of the status quo in Portuguese Africa. The Community idea foundered on this point, which is in accordance with the political and economic cross-purposes for Portuguese Africa each side saw in the otherwise sentimental and cultural arrangement. Since offering the Community in 1965 Lisbon was consistent in hoping that it would serve to channel enough Brazilian economic interest into Portuguese Africa to shore up control of the rebellions, going so far as Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira's hinting at military relationships during the Castello Branco government. Brazil saw the concept differently, usually as leading to a timetable for independence. Portuguese diplomats were aware of this intention and wondered whether Brazil was actually using the theme of "special ties" and the treaties which were not implemented as a lure to entice Portugal to give independence to the colonies in exchange for a more profitable economic relationship with Brazil.

Effusive public demonstrations and official statements to the contrary, May, 1973, saw the derailment of the Luso-Brazilian Community. The subject of the African territories was not mentioned in the Médici-Caetano joint communiqué issued in Lisbon, but bilateral commercial relations (quite diminutive, in reality) and the flow of Community rhetoric were little affected by the differences in policy. The matter of the creation of a free-trade zone remained open for each side to continue to examine. Through the political disagreement Portugal lost its last opportunity to secure public Brazilian "comprehension" of its colonialist position and so suffered another defeat related to its African sovereignty. Brazil, convinced of the inevitable independence of the colonies through erosion of Portugal's control and its international position, held up advancement of the triangular Community idea within the government by suspending all officially sponsored operations in Portuguese Africa, but allowing private enterprise and trade to proceed normally on their own. To avoid Brazilian involvement with the colonial administration, no further governmental advances on the Com-
munity could be made until Portugal liberalized its African policy.

The most controversial decision was to postpone the plans of Petrobrás to explore for petroleum in Angola, under discussion since 1968. (General Ernesto Geisel, then Director of Petrobrás and now President of Brazil, was at that time a partisan of the Luso-Brazilian Community concept, as was his advisor, General Golbery do Couto e Silva.) The more conservative military officers supporting the government also tended to advocate the Community and share Lisbon's world view and were annoyed by the removal of the possibility of joint maneuvers with Portugal and South Africa and of the hope of bases across the South Atlantic. Dubious about the effectiveness of international organizations such as the United Nations, proponents of the Community believed that Brazil was giving up concrete advantages for the illusory prospect of courting African votes on resolutions with little practical effect.

More uniformity characterized the Brazilian position now that the Foreign Ministry view of the political features of the situation had, in general, triumphed over that of the Finance Ministry and defenders of a Community on Lisbon's terms. A number of political factors, however, kept this policy change slow and little publicized. First, after years of defending Lisbon's case in the UN, a sudden switch would be politically unfeasible. There was also strong sentiment in favor of good relations with Portugal in both governmental circles and the issue public, and the emotional quality of the relationship had been enhanced by the ceremonies of the last two years. Portugal continued to appeal to susceptible groups in Brazil with some success. Further, at a deeper level, a vital component of the Brazilian interpretation of national unity has been lavish praise of the virtues of Portuguese colonization in history and civic texts; to contradict suddenly this element of the national image by criticizing Portugal in Africa could have been domestically disruptive.

Another consideration which affected its international positions was Brazil's own difficulties with Marxist terrorist groups dating from 1967 and tapering off in 1972; a military-based government with an internal security problem was not likely to vote in favor of international resolutions supporting wars of national liberation or terrorism as a political weapon, which was the manner in which resolutions on Portuguese Africa were often framed in the early 1970s.

Another motive which in the government's assessment counseled against a rapid and obvious switch to condemnation of Portugal was Brazil's desire to exercise a mediating role in the independence of Portuguese Africa, a role which its diplomats felt could best be preceded by a moderate position on the issue, maintaining a unique communication and credibility in the Portuguese and the African camps. The mediator function is not a new idea in Brazilian diplomacy, since the country served as a go-between in U.S.-Spanish American relations a number of times earlier in this century. President Quadros in 1961 cited Brazil's African and Western origins to claim that it could serve as a "bridge" between the West and Africa, first bringing the sentiment to general world attention. As early as 1964, Senegal's President Leopold Senghor described a possible Brazilian mediation between Portugal and Africa, based on his country's experience as a mediator between France and Algeria a few years earlier.

This theme was later taken up by numerous African officials who, rather than just flatly condemning Brazilian ties to Portugal and interest in Portuguese Africa, urged Brazil to use the special relationship to influence Portuguese policy toward liberation. Kenya's Foreign Minister Mungai, for example, during a visit to Brazil in August, 1972, made a public statement that he was requesting Brazilian help to persuade Portugal to free the colonies, after which a commonwealth-type association could be formed. This message was repeated when Gibson visited Kenya in early 1973, and when a group of students from the National War College (Escola Superior de Guerra) on an African tour several months later received a briefing from a Senior Deputy Secretary of Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The general African demand at this time was that initial talks must take place between Brazil and the liberation movements, doubly unlikely because Portugal did not recognize the movements'
legitimacy and because Brazil several months earlier had voted (with only five others) against UN General Assembly Resolution 2918, which called upon Portugal to take up negotiations with the rebels as the authentic representatives of the peoples of the territories. The official Portuguese opinion of what Brazilian “availability” should accomplish was described by Prime Minister Caetano himself in an interview with a Rio de Janeiro daily as interpretation of the Portuguese position to the African countries as one of building racial harmony in Angola and Mozambique. The African sense of “mediation,” and that used by many Brazilians, of urging the granting of independence, was, according to Caetano, completely out of the question and compared to a hypothetical Portuguese offer of “mediation” between Brazilian terrorists supported from abroad and the Brazilian government (O Globo, December 28, 1973: 15).

If Brazil’s choice of stances to preserve its availability had struck the Portuguese as biased toward what they termed a non-existent cause, African diplomats (especially from the more militant states) often described the same posture as less than neutral and openly expressed their suspicion of Brazilian intentions in Africa and Latin America. Senegal’s Ambassador to Argentina, Medoune Fall, a defender of the either-or option for Brazil in Africa, condemned Brazil for using its African ethnic roots “to diminish the hostility that we feel toward all those who, like the Brazilian government, support Portuguese colonialism in Africa” (Brasil Exportação, 1974: 79). Since the 1964 Revolution, Brazil voted consistently against the resolutions on Portuguese Africa in the United Nations General Assembly (the only developing country to do so), siding between 1968 and 1971 with only two to seven other countries, most commonly remaining isolated with Portugal, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the negative vote.

Brazil in recent years had a tendency to abstain rather than vote negatively only if South Africa was included in the resolution or if informational activities were stressed in the wording. While condemning apartheid, Brazil opened communication lines (air and sea) to South Africa and increased its exports to the Republic by 350 percent between 1968 ($9.7 million) and 1973 ($33.9 million), asserting that international isolation would not help the conditions of the blacks of the country. Brazil’s close relationship with the United States (commercially and militarily), its support of the isolation of Cuba in the Western Hemisphere, its defense of multinational corporations, and charges of imperialism made against it by Spanish Americans were taken by African diplomats as indicating a political philosophy which disqualified Brazil for inclusion in the Third World or a truly sympathetic perception of the African side of the colonial issue. In African eyes, the Brazilian government began to suffer competition in its image and policy in Africa from the more populist government of Argentina, which under Cámara and the Peronists was developing a political line more compatible with that of the Organization of African Unity. Although some scholars and parties outside the immediate dispute believed in the viability of Brazilian mediation, the principal actors remained to be fully convinced and the international environment had to become more favorable before latent availability could be generally recognized and drawn upon. Meanwhile, the Brazilian government kept a discreet silence on the matter, commenting only that mediation is requested rather than offered. The national press occasionally reopened the subject in response to changes in the African situation and sometimes with information from what were said to be sources within the Foreign Ministry.

The unmistakable reversal in attitudes on Portuguese Africa came with the sequel to the October, 1973, Middle East war when petroleum supplies became a political weapon and African-Arab unity was focused against Israel, South Africa, and Portugal. Events during the month of November put heavy cross-pressure on Brazil, with strong indications that a rethinking of the policy was in progress. The last traditional stand took place on November 2 in the UN General Assembly when Brazil was one of seven states to vote against Resolution 3061, welcoming the self-declared independence of Guinea-Bissau and condemning Portugal for “illegal occupation” of areas of the country.
With Portugal, Brazil argued that the Republic of Guinea-Bissau was a legal fiction because it did not fulfill the juridical prerequisites of sovereignty over the territory claimed, recognition by a majority of the population, and commitment to fulfill international obligations.

At the same time, however, Afro-Arab unity was becoming operative as the Arabs obtained the tightening of diplomatic isolation of Israel by the Africans in return for promised Arab oil boycotts against South Africa, Portugal, and countries supporting them. Dependent upon the Middle East for about 70 percent of the petroleum imported, Brazil could not long remain indifferent to what was a potential threat to its industrial boom. Good relations with the neutralist nations suddenly took on significance beyond limited trade and commodity cooperation.

Although not yet singled out for “friend” or “enemy” status by the Arabs, the Brazilian government used the occasion of the November visit of Foreign Minister Arsène Usher Assouan of the Ivory Coast (a “moderate” government on the colonies issue) to signal a policy shift. Assouan publicly requested Brazil to intercede with Portugal to facilitate the independence of Guinea-Bissau, adding that in the racial sense Portuguese Africa was “the reproduction of Brazil in Africa” (West African, November 12, 1973: 1616). In the joint communiqué, reference was made to the “right of peoples to self-determination and independence,” the first time that “independence” was used in a Brazilian communiqué with an African nation. As a concomitant, instructions were given to the Brazilian Ambassador to the United Nations to abstain in future votes on Portuguese Africa, a fact “leaked” to the press. After a mid-November meeting between Foreign Minister Gibson and Portuguese Ambassador Saraiva, the change was so generally perceived that a sharp debate occurred in the Brazilian media between those (especially of the Portuguese colony) opposing policy review and those favoring it. In a matter of several weeks the editorials of the major newspapers shifted from the usual sympathy for the Portuguese position to advocacy of support for national interests and encouragement of a timetable for independence. Given the strength of the pro-Portuguese issue public, such a turnabout had to be cautiously handled by government censors and opinion leaders, but a public opinion campaign sensitive to the new currents in the Foreign Ministry was obviously under way in preparation for future political changes.

With great American dependence on Portugal in the Azores for the supplying of Israel in the October 1973 war, the Africans acted upon their belief that Brazil was the country most likely to have sufficient credibility with Portugal to influence a colonial policy change. Because of the “special ties,” loss of Brazilian sympathy would be a considerable reversal for Lisbon, perhaps enough to move that government off political inertia on Africa. In addition to trade missions from Kenya and Ghana, Brazil received two hard African shores during November to speed the process of decision. The most unmistakable was the November 24 17-nation resolution of Central and East African countries which included Brazil in a list of six countries recommended for diplomatic and economic sanctions unless they ceased support for white-minority governments in Southern Africa. This immediately put Brazil in the potential target area of an Arab oil embargo, given the energetic way in which the Africans were utilizing their new-found alliance with the Arabs. It was obvious to observers that Brazil was cited because of support for Portugal and trade with South Africa, but the resolution engendered uncertainty in Brasília about what future actions might be taken against Brazil by the Afro-Arab coalition which had surprised the world with its rapid agreement.

The second shock that month was the UN General Assembly Economic and Social Commission’s vote on Resolution 3129, for approval of international standards and prior consultation for cooperative exploitation of resources shared by two or more states. The Africans strongly backed the Argentine position against the Brazilian one in a dispute originating with Brazil’s hydroelectric projects on the Paraná River, in which it held that prior consultations with Argentina would violate its sovereignty. In Brasília, this setback on a priority issue was widely interpreted as a practical demonstration of African gratitude to
Argentina and a warning to Brazil because of the positions each country took on the colonial question generally and the vote on Guinea-Bissau in particular. Further, the implementation of the trade and cultural treaties signed by Gibson during his African tour a year earlier had swung on African displeasure with the Portuguese Africa policy. Since these treaties held elements of definite interest to Brazil and were some of the Foreign Minister's favorite achievements, the Africans could use them as a pressure point. President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, for example, decided to suspend negotiations between Varig and Air-Zaire for a Rio de Janeiro-Kinshasa flight, helpful for Brazil's growing trade with Zaire, because Varig insisted on including connections with Luanda, Cape Town, and Lourenço Marques.

Although Brazilian diplomats were prone to insist that the Africans overrated Brazilian influence with Portugal, that Portugal had previously taken its support for granted and would in all probability continue on course without it, a noticeable shift in policy was made. At the United Nations, abstention or absence on Portuguese questions became the rule, illustrated by abstention in the Special Commission on a resolution calling for UN investigations of the Wiriyam and Chavola massacres and absence during a General Assembly vote on Portugal's claim to be the representative of Portuguese Africa in the world body. These actions, untypical of policy since the 1964 Revolution, were meant to communicate to Lisbon the Foreign Ministry's weariness with Portuguese intransigence. Given the continuation to that intransigence despite the upsurge of the issue in national attention, Brazilian policy had to be reactive rather than innovative while passively waiting for a more relevant role in an unpredictable situation well beyond national control.

By the end of 1973 enough incremental reconsideration had come about that an official consensus favored a negotiated solution for the independence of the colonies to facilitate the survival of Portuguese culture and the creation of governments friendly to Brazil, with moderate foreign policies. Official usage of "overseas territories" was completely dropped as the tone of public comment began to change. Because the colonies were in a neglected state of political development, great care had to be taken in guiding their political evolution to avoid chaos, perhaps with a preparatory period prior to independence. Brazil hoped to contribute to this type of solution with quiet diplomacy made possible by the Community concept, but was required to retain the confidence of both Africans and Portuguese to do so. Thus, two polar options were ruled out, either supporting Portuguese intractability or repudiating Portugal completely on behalf of Third World interests. The moderate middle course of persistent and cautious persuasion, sponsored by the Foreign Ministry, began to gain adherents. The plausibility and usefulness of this idea, although made much more difficult by recent international polarization, was verified by a Brazilian and African tour undertaken in November and December 1973 by U.S. Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (D) of Michigan, to explore ways of resolving the colonial impasse. Brazil preferred to see Portugal itself implement a gradual schedule for independence, followed by the effective formation of the multilateral Community of independent nations. Eventual independence of Portuguese Africa continued as a precondition for better relations and cooperation with Portugal. The last public indication of support for Portugal was a press report that Petrobrás was rethinking the decision to stay out of Angola because of the new petroleum politics, but the earlier judgment prevailed and the project remained dormant (Jornal do Brasil, November 11, 1973: 38).

In making the decision about how to proceed further on the Portuguese Africa question, it was necessary to weigh the national interests of cooperating with Portugal against those gained by closer approximation to Black Africa. The Luso-Brazilian Community had produced benefits for Brazil through modest investments in Angola, sources for raw materials, a cultural presence in Portuguese-speaking territories, and understandings with Portugal on adherence of Angolan coffee production (the world's third largest) to the Café Mundial producers' agreement. Trade turnover with Portuguese Africa grew 95-fold from 1968 to 1973, but still in the latter year comprised only 0.35 percent of Brazil's total import and export figure. Although
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Black Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Imports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Black Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CACEX, Banco do Brasil. Figures are rounded off to the nearest tenth. Trade with Portuguese Guinea was negligible.

It expanded faster than trade with Black Africa, exchange with Angola and Mozambique was inherently limited by the restricted size of the consumer market and preferences for their raw materials in Portugal, as well as their closer political relations with Portugal. The principal Brazilian imports in 1972 and 1973 were asbestos, copper bars, chrome, zinc, and Brazil nuts (from Mozambique). The export line to the colonies was much more diversified, with representation from the textile, machinery, appliances, building supplies, and book sectors, along with raw materials such as sugar.

Future plans for trade with the colonies contemplated further exchanges of this nature. A Foreign Ministry publication for businessmen on trade with Portugal described the colonies as “a market of high potential and of increasing interest to Brazil as [they] develop commercially and economically” (Brasil, 1973: 43). An economic mission of the Luso-Brazilian Business Center (CELB) of the National Confederation of Industry (the latter a strong defender of the Community) went to Portuguese Africa in May 1972 and found several obstacles to trade with those areas, including insufficient transportation and colonial currency regulations, but concluded that in the longer run the colonies were markets well worth exploring in view of the acceptance of Brazilian products and culture there. The CELB further concluded that the strengthening of the Community on the commercial, technological and cultural plane was a task to which the private sector could contribute greatly, as a follow-up to the exchange visits of finance ministers in early 1972. (No mention was made in the final report of the controversial aspects of such an approximation; Confederação Nacional da Indústria, 1972.) Brazilian participation with 57 companies in the October 1972 International Trade Fair in Luanda was the principal cause of the 1973 jump in trade and verified Angolan interest in a wide variety of manufactured products.

Analysis of the economic factor only, however, does not reveal the most tenacious problems for Brazilian policy toward Portuguese Africa. The origins of the indecision are heavily cultural, in both the traditional bonds of friendship with...
Portugal and the consequent acceptance among conservative political influentials of the Portuguese perception of African events, not to mention a scarcity of studies on Africa in the Portuguese language from other than Portuguese sources. This sector saw reproductions of Brazil being born in Africa and was convinced that their development into racial democracies could best be protected under Portuguese tutelage (Garrido Torres, 1968). The debate was first joined on the issue of how much these emotional ties should be allowed to affect negatively Brazilian activities among developing countries hostile to the Portuguese presence in Africa. Since the 1964 revolution, vocal elements of the public and the military forces favoring Portugal held tight rein over this area of national policy, tying criticism of Portugal in Africa to sympathizers of the discredited Quadros and Goulart governments. Only through comprehension of the emotional nature of the sensitivity of the issue in Brazilian domestic politics, along with the absence of a strong countervailing pressure group, can the cause of the slowness of change be fully appreciated.

As Brazilian foreign policy gathered a more cohesive national interest orientation and a global perspective in the late 1960s and early 1970s, an objective examination of the attrition caused by the traditional policy became imperative. New options were opening in Afro-Asia which demanded closer attention, including the African trade (particularly with Nigeria, Zaire, and Zambia), Petrobrás’ petroleum purchases and explorations in African and Arab lands, commodities cooperation in producers’ agreements, advantage of a leadership position among the LDC’s, garnering neutralist support on international economic issues and political ones such as law of the sea, image-building in Africa, and the attraction of Arab capital. In the anti-colonialist political environment of Third World international relations, the mere consideration of these options as viable for Brazil automatically opened the previously sealed Portuguese Africa policy. The admission within the government that new international conditions existed was corrosive to the standpattism of the pro-Lisbon factions, which witnessed the inexorable loss of one point after another as the question became less one of how to preserve Portuguese interests and more one of how to preserve Brazil’s (which were now acknowledged not to coincide in all points with the future Lisbon wanted for the colonies). Once this firm distinction in interests was made by Brazil, as it was in late 1973 or early 1974, and was perceived by both sides, a falling out was inevitable. Lisbon would not condone a separate Brazilian policy on the colonies and tied further concessions to colonialist support. Given Portuguese official suspicions of Brazilian intentions, Brazilians could no longer set anything but an independent course and hope to preserve an important future role in Portuguese Africa after independence and a favorable relationship with Afro-Asian states.

Nigeria was pivotal in the African attempt to pressure Brazil, although many countries contributed. Nigeria for several years had been regarded by businessmen and the Foreign Ministry as the most promising Black African market for manufactured goods and a reliable source of petroleum. From 1969 to 1973, imports from Nigeria had steadily averaged $21.3 million a year, and the attractiveness of its petroleum suggested an increase, but so little was sold to Nigeria that Brazil accrued a trade deficit of $101.3 million during those years. The Afro-Arab understanding on petroleum politics saw the Arabs leave to Nigeria the matter of any political demands on Brazil in exchange for oil sales. Nigeria’s role as predominant leader of the OAU and a critic of Brazilian relations with Portugal had inherent political implications for its relationship with Brazil, which hoped to be one of the largest customers for its oil. On the other hand, Nigeria advocated a negotiated solution in the colonies and was a leader of the moderate African faction which wished to take Portuguese rights into account in a settlement, encouraging Portuguese participation in development of the new countries. Since this outcome was congenial to future Brazilian interests, an understanding with Nigeria was crucial.

For this reason the January, 1974, visit of Foreign Minister Okoi Arikpo took on significance in Brazilian calculations as an indicator of how well the Africans had received the policy adjustments.
Brasília passed the test. In several statements to the press, Arikpo expressed satisfaction with the new attitudes of the government and the press toward the colonies. It was to this new attitude that he attributed the first steps toward much closer Nigerian-Brazilian cooperation, which he said would be reflected in the Brazilian relationship with all of Africa. Advances made included plans for a system of direct sales of petroleum to Brazil through joint action of the state oil companies, increased technical exchange in several fields, and an increase in the sales of Brazilian manufactures to Nigeria. Praising Brazil's important role in the international relations of the Third World, Arikpo announced a system of consultation between the two countries, aiming at close political cooperation in international organizations. The successful conversations on political subjects, he added, were more "stimulating" than the conversations on economic matters. The language of the joint communiqué condemning "apartheid and colonialism" was carefully chosen by Brazilian diplomats to expand upon that employed at the time of Assouan's visit. On the frequent question of petroleum politics, Arikpo said, "Nigeria does not support the view that petroleum should be used as a political weapon, but it is clear that, in any case, to negotiate with friends is easier than with enemies." (O Globo, January 26, 1974: 5). Brazil had clearly won friendly status from Nigeria.

The Médici administration still regarded the colonial question as a sensitive one and was reluctant to give the public impression that an open break from or a desertion of Portugal might be imminent. Events during that government's last several months were not encouraging to Lisbon as Brasília moved further toward an African policy which posited that what was good for Brazil did not have to be good for Portugal as well. As his last public act, outgoing Foreign Minister Gibson attended a ceremony establishing an Afro-Brazilian museum in Salvador and praised the African contribution to Brazilian culture in terms unheard from a Foreign Minister since Quadros' enthusiastic overture to Africa 13 years earlier. Prime Minister Caetano, now under political attack because of reverses in the battles in Africa, roundly denounced Brazilian withdrawal of support:

"Those in the Western Hemisphere who are getting up hopes that by forcing Angola and Mozambique to cease being Portuguese they would have security on the other side of the Atlantic are thoroughly mistaken" (Visão, April 8, 1974: 30). Criticism of Brazil in the official Portuguese press further dramatized the degeneration of relations and the flimsiness of Brazilian hopes for mediation.

The priorities and formulations introduced in March, 1974 by President Geisel and Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira for general foreign relations reappraisal served to deal Portugal further out of Brazil's broadening game. The Geisel government's orientation was defined in a number of public statements. Brazil's interests were to be considered in global terms and its approach would be one of "flexible responsibility," judging each issue according to its effect on the national interest and cooperating with countries with overlapping interests. Brazil was now assuming "international responsibilities" and enjoyed a "growing margin of international action," so it could no longer be "subject to automatic alignments." A special attention was to be paid to "sister nations in the neighborhood on this and the other side of the ocean"; Africa was now to be regarded as joined to rather than separated from Brazil by the South Atlantic, with priority for West Africa and Portuguese Africa. It was made known that the delegation to the UN was prepared to vote in favor of an African resolution on the colonies, if drawn up in a moderate tone.

The supply of raw materials, and especially petroleum, would assume much greater importance. In the first two months of 1974, Brazil spent 550 percent more on oil than in the first four months of 1973, even though the quantity purchased rose only 37.8 percent (O Estado de São Paulo, April 17, 1974: 3). Brazil had to adjust its political relationships accordingly, to safeguard its economic growth and balance of payments. The acceleration of the change in the colonial question was now part of this larger picture of shifts in attitudes toward better relations with the Arabs, China, the Soviet Union, Venezuela, and Argentina and consideration of the positive and negative effects on Brazil of producer cartels.
The April 25 revolution of the Junta of National Salvation which overthrew Portuguese Prime Minister Caetano introduced numerous complexities into the calculations. In being the first to recognize the Spinola government, Brazil was able to show itself in favor of a liberalization of the African policy. The immediate impression was that of a positive breakthrough in relations with Portugal, Portuguese Africa, Black Africa, and the Arabs, but the political situation in Lisbon was too undefined to take any immediate initiatives. The government’s public attitude was one of “observation,” citing the impropriety of comment on the internal affairs of another country, even though loss of Brazilian support had negatively affected the delicate political balance of the former government and thus, by adding to Portugal’s isolation, may have been a contributing element to the coup.

Initial Brazilian public reaction to the revolution was generally favorable and laudatory of General Spinola’s intentions to negotiate an end to the colonial wars while preserving a relationship with the territories. The major newspapers sent special reporters to Portugal and the colonies to document developments closely. On the surface, relations between Lisbon and Brasília seemed to ease during the first weeks of the revolutionary government. The Lisbon provisional government’s published program spoke of making the Community an “effort in terms of practical effectiveness.” The Geisel government expressed eagerness for better relations as well on the basis of the traditional friendship and abstained on the May 16 vote on the admission to the World Health Organization of Guinea-Bissau. By the end of May, however, diplomatic strains were reflected in a drop in diplomatic communication with mutual fault-finding on the causes. Foreign Minister Mário Soares began a round of tours through Western Europe, demonstrating that Portugal was choosing the road to European identification and ignoring Brazilian possibilities. Brazil was further shunted aside by Portuguese determination to keep resolution of the colonial issue in their close control by talking directly to the guerrilla leaders.

Areas of political incompatibility began cropping up. The Portuguese coup occurred soon after Geisel’s inauguration in Brazil, when talk of “redemocratization” and “decompression” was popular as civilian politicians anticipated an opening of the system. Numerous writers took the opportunity to speculate on the lessons for authoritarian Brazil held by the Portuguese experience, commenting upon the fragility of rightist dictatorships erected as guards against leftism and noting the necessity of gradual political decompression. Besides being concerned about this aspect of Portugal’s “bad example,” military sectors in the Brazilian government were surprise by the rapidity with which the new regime moved to the left with a cabinet of two communists and three socialists. They had expected a more conservative outcome from a military intervention, and by early June official circles questioned how well Spinola could contain the “revolutionary fervor.” These fears were greatly magnified by the relative instability in Lisbon, the speed with which negotiations with the African rebels were taken up, anti-government demonstrations of exiled Brazilians from Algeria in front of the embassy in Lisbon, criticism of Brazil in the Portuguese press, and a concern that the second cabinet (formed in July) registered a victory for left-wing forces in the military. The further left the Spinola regime moved, the more difficult would be the relationship with Portugal and the fewer would be Brazil’s opportunities to assist as midwife in the birth of Portuguese-speaking African republics.

At this delicate juncture, Portugal had no ambassador in Brasília and the recently-arrived Brazilian Ambassador to Lisbon, General Carlos Alberto Fontoura (former director of the National Intelligence Service) was a controversial figure. Politically more compatible with the Caetano regime than the Spinola one, Fontoura rapidly found himself out of sorts with Portuguese public opinion as the press criticized his former position, but Brasília insisted that he remain as representative. Another set of misunderstandings revolved around the asylum granted to Americo Thomás and Marcelo Caetano by Brazil at the request of General Spinola. The first secretary of the Embassy in Lisbon was quoted in a UPI dispatch as saying that
the Portuguese request was accepted by Brazil without "satisfaction," a characterization denied later by the Foreign Ministry (O Estado de São Paulo, May 21, 1974: 14). No official note on the case was distributed, as would be the usual practice. The two former leaders were banned from any political activity in Brazil; Thomás remained sequestered with friends and Caetano took a position as law professor in a Rio de Janeiro university. Although Portuguese leftist groups complained that they had escaped without trial, some Brazilian diplomats saw in this gesture to Lisbon a favor which might be reciprocated. Others feared a negative impact on the national image in Black and Portuguese Africa through identification of the Geisel government with the deposed rulers.

On colonial matters, Brasília reiterated that the wider Afro-Luso-Brazilian Community was acceptable in theory, but only if all people involved were "sovereign and on the same level of representation." As part of the "watchful observer" neutrality status, the Foreign Ministry cancelled plans for participation in Mozambique's trade fair (FACIM) in May, departing from the principle of alternating expositions in the yearly trade fairs of Angola and Mozambique. President Geisel and Spinola exchanged friendly messages, but no mention was made of the colonial issue.

Seeing that it was being left out of the game, Brasília made a strong last try to become an actor by expressing availability for a "broad dialogue" without publicly mentioning mediation. President Geisel and Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira sent messages of congratulations to the OAU on its anniversary. Soon afterwards, on June 5, the Foreign Ministry publicized the receipt of a note, sent about a month earlier, from the Secretary-General of the OAU, N'z'o Ekangaki, requesting Brasilia to influence Lisbon in the direction of recognizing the independence of Guinea-Bissau and the granting of independence to Angola and Mozambique. The text of the communiqué, worded in firm language, was relayed by Ambassador Fontoura to Foreign Minister Soares in a gesture of good offices and its receipt publicized in Brazil before a reply could be received from Lisbon.

Three days later, the Foreign Ministry issued and sent to the OAU the following policy statement on the colonies, the most explicit ever published (Boletim Especial, June 10, 1974):

Given the evolution of the problem, the Brazilian government feels that this is the opportune time to make public its position in relation to the Portuguese territories in Africa, which is as follows:

1. The special ties of friendship which unite Brazil to Portugal and to all the African nations and, in a special way, the natural interest of the Brazilian people in the destiny of the brother peoples of the territories under Portuguese administration in Africa, clearly place on the Brazilian government the duty to collaborate to find a solution which will assure the destiny to which these peoples have a right in the community of nations.

2. The Brazilian government is convinced that the circumstances created around the Portuguese problem in Africa can give opportunity for a peaceful solution which will assure respect for the legitimate aspirations of the interested peoples.

3. Brazil condemns all forms of colonialist or racist policy. Therefore it has always repudiated solutions of this type, heavily condemned in international forums, with the support of Brazil.

4. The Brazilian government does not wish to mediate and therefore is not offering to mediate. It is, however, prepared to lend all the collaboration which may be requested of it by the interested parties, to which Brazil feels linked by history, race, and culture.

The effect of this initiative on the African-Portuguese situation was nil. Secretary-General N'z'o Ekangaki had been forced to resign his position for political reasons soon after the OAU note was written, and the interest proved to be more personal than institutional. The Brazilian Ambassador to Egypt, sent as observer to the OAU Mogadishu Conference of African Heads of State, was unable to muster OAU backing for a Brazilian place in the scheme of things because of lack of general African enthusiasm. Brazil was too recently converted to the cause to be acceptable to the Africans now that Portugal was negotiating.

The impact of these maneuvers on the willingness of leaders of the Portuguese liberation movements to regard a Brazilian role favorably can only be surmised. A number of them, including Agostinho Neto of Angola, criticized Brazil's social
situation as racist because whites are preponderant at the top and blacks at the bottom. Neto had expressed concern a year earlier at “the contacts of certain African countries, which think Brazil would have a favorable influence over Portugal. In fact, the situation is quite the opposite.” At the same time some PAIGC members contacted Brazilian opposition elements to report their fears of Brazilian military involvement with the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau (Latin America, June 29, 1973: 205). Pedro Pires, a minister in the PAIGC rebel government, voiced a common sentiment when he stated in an interview to a Brazilian magazine that, although the press talked a lot about Brazilian mediation, “In our view, the anticolonialist policy of Brazil did not seem clear enough to allow its intervention as mediator” (Veja, June 5, 1974: 34-35). In the Brazilian media, several other rebel leaders were quoted as saying that Brazilian mediation was unnecessary and would just complicate things.

The same day that the position paper was released, General Carlos Galvão de Melo, a member of the junta, and Major Victor Alves, a leader of the Armed Forces Movement, arrived in Rio at the invitation of the Brazilian government for a visit of several days (the first to a foreign country by a junta member). The main effect of their stay turned out to be the reassurance of the divided local Portuguese colony regarding the junta’s popularity, its good intentions, and its continuing need for the traditional inflow of cash from emigrants. Privately the Portuguese Foreign Ministry regarded the Brazilian statement of availability for mediation as ludicrous and simply another example of Brazilian “self-promotion,” because it could see no purpose in interposing a rightist dictatorship between two liberating and progressive political movements.

Faced with African indifference and Portuguese mistrust, Brazil found the mediation role outrun by events and the “special ties” weakened by them. The Foreign Ministry by the end of June was forced into a judicious reevaluation of the national potential in Portuguese Africa in terms of what was desirable, what was allowed by circumstances, and what the country had the limited capacity to achieve. The easy diplomatic prominence once imagined as a consequence of successful mediator status was illusory and began to look less attractive as the complicated nature of the multilateral problem became undeniable. The longer the matter was closely examined, the more officials could see a possible diplomatic donkey brook. Contending factions in the Angolan liberation movements and the cleavages between whites and FRELIMO in Mozambique compounded the conflicting interests of South Africa, Rhodesia, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Further, Angola and Mozambique would be independent black states at the border of the continuing racial conflict in Southern Africa, so that locating a major Brazilian involvement there might not be the wisest choice for that country’s first serious extrahemispheric commitment as an aspiring major power.

Once quick optimism was swept away, a more reserved approach to the territories began to evolve. The Geisel Foreign Ministry showed itself much less eager than the previous one to throw itself energetically or to be pulled into the African-Portuguese breach, seeing that Brazil had more to lose than to gain by hasty entry into a conflict under the assumption of claiming a cultural “inheritance.” Yet the government continued to maintain that Portuguese Africa was a region of “special historical responsibility” for Brazil, a theme echoed by the press.

While Brazil had played no part in the independence process of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, and detailed questions of the kind of relationship to be carried on after independence had to be left to the future, the imperatives of policy reconsideration of the moment demanded unilateral action. When the Guinea-Bissau permanent observer at the UN approached the Brazilian Ambassador on July 16 to request support for its bid for UN membership, after a Silveira-Geisel conference the government rapidly agreed and extended tacit recognition to the Republic on July 18. By that time, 84 countries (mainly Afro-Asian) had already recognized the self-proclaimed state, so Brazil’s decision came well after that of the neutralists but six days before Japan’s and 17 days before the UN’s announcement that Portugal was prepared to recognize the Republic. This represented a considerable evolution from
its negative UN vote eight months previously and contrasted with the recognition by the Common Market and Canada, made on August 12, eight days after the UN announcement and therefore more politically sensitive to the Portuguese lead. In the Brazilian statement on recognition, no official position was taken on the controversial question of the future of the strategic Cape Verde Islands, which was said to be a diplomatic gesture making it easier for Lisbon to postpone its consideration, which was the course eventually chosen. Diplomatic observers asserted that the timing of the recognition was constructive and crucial, because the political situation in the metropolis was then susceptible to just such a positive nudge in favor of acceleration of independence. A hint on political direction toward Angola and Mozambique was contained in the conclusion of the official note that “The incorporation of a new Portuguese-speaking sister nation into the international community is received with particular satisfaction by the Brazilian government” (Jornal do Brasil, July 19, 1974: 3). That theme and references to the desirability of a national interest in Portuguese Africa’s future characterized the heavily favorable press reactions to the surprise event.

Having once more tackled in the African direction, Brazil incurred predictable negative Portuguese reaction, because even with the defeat of Salazarism Lisbon expected Brazil to continue to follow its lead on colonial matters. Contrary to a strict interpretation of the spirit of the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation, Portuguese Foreign Minister Soares was informed of the Brazilian decision as a fait accompli by Ambassador Fontoura only hours before it was publicly announced. Apparently intended by Brazil as a shock treatment in return for the aloofness with which Lisbon was treating it, this abruptness was taken as a diplomatic slight by the Portuguese and caused a chill in relations.

The surprise recognition represented tacit admission of the abandonment of Brazil’s illusory hopes for special consideration from Lisbon and a clear sign of present and future independence in the relationships with both Black Africa and Portuguese Africa. The Lisbon government broke off the usual diplomatic consultations at the time of the April revolution, did not respond to the OAU note, and discussed the future of Portuguese Africa with Europeans rather than with Brazilians. Lisbon never officially recognized the existence or legitimacy of the special interest which the Brazilians repeatedly said they had in the territories. In the Brazilian official interpretation, since a frank dialogue was not in progress and Lisbon ignored friendly gestures, the Treaty was irrelevant in either direction, so Brazil could not have counted on being advised beforehand of an imminent concession of independence. The Portuguese cabinet crisis of early July had strengthened the hand of the partisans of rapid independence for Guinea-Bissau over those favoring modified retention or slower settlement. A decision to acknowledge the right to independence of the people of the territories was made by the Portuguese Council of State in closed session on July 19, the day following the announcement of Brazilian recognition. With so little warning time, gathered from its reports on the rapidly changing Portuguese political situation, Brazil had to act quickly to keep from getting to Guinea-Bissau after Portugal and to gather what credit remained for the new African policy. Its recognition announcement came only six days before Lisbon’s announcement of the Council’s decision on July 24.

The absence of prior consultation and the timing led Lisbon to look upon the act as gratuitous and troublesome, indicative to some of reasons to suspect Brazilian intentions in Portuguese Africa. General Spinola, to whom Guinea-Bissau was a special concern, was said to have been particularly displeased and “offended” by the unexpected move. In an interview for a Brazilian newspaper, however, Foreign Minister Soares, of deeper anti-colonialist sentiments, lamented the lack of previous information but added, “I believe that this fact does not have extraordinary weight” (O Estado de São Paulo, July 25, 1974). His statement was supported by the new Portuguese Ambassador to Brazil, Vasco Futscher Pereira, who termed Brazil the “cornerstone” of his country’s international relations, such that “Portugal is willing to do anything to effectively avoid any mis-
understanding in or cooling of our relations” (Fôlha de São Paulo, August 2, 1974: 4).

The resignation of Spinola in September and his subsequent exile in Brazil heightened Brazilian concern about the leftward drift of Portuguese politics and the viability of an early relationship with the former colonies, beginning in the transitional period itself. In his plenary address opening the UN General Assembly debate on September 23, Azeredo da Silveira, speaking in Spanish, took the unusual step of addressing the Guinea-Bissau delegation in Portuguese to pledge a “close and fertile friendship,” and to quote the assassinated rebel leader Amilcar Cabral as advocating a broad relationship between Brazil and Portuguese Africa. An amiable meeting with Soares on the same occasion and an almost-postponed Azeredo da Silveira visit to Lisbon in early December, while airing a great number of specific bilateral political problems to be worked out, demonstrated the willingness of both sides to maintain a frank dialogue in a general atmosphere of confidence. Portugal showed itself amenable to a Brazilian cultural and economic presence in the independent colonies. Brazil affirmed that it had no desire to become a safe haven for dissatisfied Salazarists of whatever origin or for Portuguese flight capital, as evidenced by restrictions placed on political activities of the Portuguese immigrants in Brazil (many critical of Lisbon’s leftward drift). The personal commitment and skillful diplomacy of the two foreign ministers overcame considerable opposition in both capitals, and their governments agreed to continuation of a cultural relationship even as growing political differences in reality impeded close political cooperation.

Conclusions

Brazilian activities in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique are now independent from ties with Lisbon, and Brasilia seems prepared to work with a wide variety of possible political regimes in the former colonies, except perhaps an extreme left or a Rhodesian-style regime. The future status of relations with Mozambique was put in doubt by Prime Minister Chissano of the provisional government in his first press conference when he criticized Brazil for lack of support in the liberation struggle and placed future relations with Brazil on the same undecided and uneasy plane as those with South Africa (O Globo, September 18, 1974: 28). This observation was confirmed when Brazil was represented at Mozambique’s independence ceremonies in June, 1975, by a delegation of Brazilian communists invited by FRELIMO at the exclusion of the Brazilian government.

Relations with Guinea-Bissau, already independent, were begun with the establishment of a Brazilian embassy in that country in September 1974, a mutually satisfactory conversation between foreign ministers, and concrete agreements for Brazilian economic and technical aid. In an early December 1974 African trip, while Azeredo da Silveira was in Lisbon, the Foreign Ministry’s Heads of the Afro-Asian Department and of the Africa Desk discussed in depth with leaders of FRELIMO, FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA the possibility of early Brazilian cooperation in Mozambique and Angola. The general impression made public by Brasilia was that of pragmatic receptivity for Brazil among at least the Angolans in spite of past or present differences on colonial or ideological matters. In March 1975 Brazil became the first country to establish relations with Angola, even before independence, by accrediting a “special representative” to the provisional government, to be elevated to ambassador status at independence. During that year, ministers from the three factions of the transitional government visited Brazil at Itamaraty’s invitation, calculated in its dispersion to avoid showing favor to only MPLA, UNITA, or FNLA in Angola’s confused political picture. Besides offering technical aid, Brasilia sent relief assistance to Angola in the form of medicine and clothes carried by a Brazilian Air Force plane in May, 1975.

While the events of 1974-1975 gave the Foreign Ministry a more accurate image of Portuguese Africa than previously held, Brazil still has done little to prepare itself for an important role in the new countries and has very limited area expertise to draw
upon. Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, however, are at
least no longer regarded as “new Brazils” but as heavily tribalistic
with a thin Portuguese cultural veneer, leading them to show
considerably greater interest in African affairs and negritude
than in an Afro-Luso-Brazilian type of relationship. Brazilian
officials feel that cultural similarities will facilitate mutually
useful future relationships, but that there will be no automatic,
overwhelming receptivity for Brazil.

Enough complementarity exists in the medium and long runs
to allow substantial trade based on exchange of Brazilian food
products and manufactured goods of a wide variety for Angolan
and Mozambican raw materials, especially petroleum, minerals,
and coal. Luanda and Lourenço Marques continue to be attrac-
tive sites for the location of warehouses of COBEC (the Brazil-
ian Warehouse and Commerce Company), administered by the
Bank of Brazil and major export firms. Luanda is served twice
monthly by both Varig Airlines and the Brazilian Lloyd Lines,
which will encourage communications and transportation across
the South Atlantic. Cooperation with Angola in coffee market-
ing can be expected to continue. Should the new countries favor
foreign investments, Brazil would be quite competitive in joint
ventures in mining, steel making, fishing, assembly plants, and
oil exploration, extraction and refining (through Petrobrás,
which is already active in several African states). Businessmen
and other professionals from Angola and Mozambique who have
visited Brazil recently have been impressed by the level of tech-
nical competence they found and have commented favorably
upon the possibilities of using that know-how in joint projects
back home. Sectors in which Brazilian technical assistance can
be profitable or has been offered include road and airstrip con-
struction, education and literacy campaigns, tropical medicine,
telecommunications, housing, colonization programs, and public
administration and finances. Programs for the training of clergy
and civil servants and the formation of a Portuguese-language
university association have been suggested by Brazilians in those
fields, and the extension of fellowships for university study in
Brazil is a probable measure of approximation. Cultural ex-
change in the arts and sports is also likely.\textsuperscript{5}

The extent of Brazil’s commitments in Portuguese-speaking
Africa is not yet clearly defined, given the unsettled political
conditions there, Brazil’s own domestic needs, and the inter-
national economic recession beginning in 1974. On the strictly
economic side, a stronger general relationship with larger
African states such as Nigeria, Zaire, and Zambia can be ex-
pected. However, when taken in the larger context of Brazil’s
recent interest in Africa, its relationship with the Third World
in international organizations, its growing self-image as a leader
among tropical countries, its expanding diplomatic presence,
and what Azeredo da Silveira termed Brazil’s “historic responsi-
bilities” in the future of those new countries, Brazil’s participa-
tion in their development can be significant and internationally
competitive, should Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique
desire it. Much about the future of the relationship depends
upon the nature of the immediate post-independence period
and the political situations established in the new countries; in
these critical matters Brazil is an insignificant factor and has
maintained careful neutrality to avoid compromising itself
disadvantageously.

NOTES

1. African sympathy for, or understanding of, the affective, cultural nature of
Luso-Brazilian relations was cited often to the author over a period of several years
by Brazilian diplomats as one of the main reasons why Brazil could separate political
aspects of its African policy and its Portuguese African policy for so long.

2. Brazilian pressure on Portugal was first publicly acknowledged by a Portuguese
official, Ambassador Futscher Pereira, on August 1, 1974 upon his arrival in Brazil.

3. History and civic texts are almost uniformly laudatory in their treatment of
the effects of Portuguese colonization on Brazil. (This, incidentally, contrasts strongly
with the scapegoating of the Spanish tradition which occurred in Spanish America.)
The few exceptions are revisionist polemics of very limited circulation. The extent of
the strength of pro-Portuguese feeling at the media and government censor level in
1973 is illustrated by the case of a prominent Brazilian author who tried to publish
Every major publisher contacted refused because the book is critical of Salazar and
Caetano, and Soares is a socialist (interview with the author).

4. A little-known abortive attempt to create conditions for Brazilian mediation
to speed the independence of Portuguese Africa through a Luso-Brazilian Commu-
nity was revealed by Roberto Campos, former Brazilian Ambassador to the United States. Campos and Finance Minister San Tiago Dantas (on a visit to the United States) were called to the State Department in 1963 by Dean Rusk to discuss a confidential plan designed to keep Angola from being shaken by the kind of civil war then rampant in the Congo. Secretary Rusk requested a Brazilian dialogue with Portugal to examine the feasibility of the formation of a Community to stabilize the conditions in the colonies and prepare them for independence, with American developmental assistance. Campos and San Tiago Dantas elaborated a rough pilot program for the organizational structure of such an association, including a timetable for independence and free elections, but further pursuit of the notion was quickly overtaken by Brazil's growing domestic instability and anti-colonialism, an unexpected American-Soviet-detente in Africa, and Portuguese military control of the uprisings (O Estado do São Paulo, May 1, 1974: 4).

5. A limited amount of work has been done on comparisons and contrasts between Brazil and Portuguese Africa. The most significant are the following:


REFERENCES

Boletim Especial, Brazilian Embassy, Washington, D.C.
Confederação Nacional da Indústria, Centro Empresarial Luso-Brasileiro (1972) Missão Brasileira à África e Portugal-Relatório. (mimeo)
O Estado do São Paulo (São Paulo).
Folha de São Paulo (São Paulo).
O Globo (Rio de Janeiro).
Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro).
Latin America (London).
Vejia (São Paulo).
Visão (São Paulo).
West African (London).

ALICE WEXLER
Department of History
California State College, Sonoma
1801 East Cotati Avenue
Rohnert Park, California 94928

PAIN AND PREJUDICE IN THE
SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN OF 1898

What is resented in Caliban is not really his physical appearance, his bestiality, his ‘evil’ instincts—... but that he should claim to be a person in his own right and from time to time to show that he has a will of his own. In other words, we are perfectly happy if we can project the fantasies of our own unconscious on to the outside world, but if we suddenly find that these creatures are not pure projections but real beings with claims to liberty, we consider it outrageous, however modest their claims. Further, it is not the claims themselves which makes us indignant, but the very desire for freedom.

—O. Mannoni (1950)

Although the United States entered the Cuban war against Spain in 1898 with a great burst of pro-Cuban enthusiasm, this friendliness suddenly soured into contempt. A revolution in public opinion during the summer of 1898 abruptly lowered the Cuban heroes to the status of villains in North American eyes, while the Spanish enemy came to be regarded as brave and honorable. A Michigan soldier expressed a characteristic view when he confessed that “while my opinion of the Spanish troops is in the ascendant, that of the Cuban troops is at the other end of the teeter. We would be better off if there was not